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  Market Power Without A Large Market Share: 
  The Role of Imperfect Information and other  
  “Consumer Protection” Market Failures  
 
       Robert H. Lande1
       March 8, 2007 
 
 
 There actually are two very different sources of market 
power in antitrust cases. The first is traditional market 
share-based market power.  
 
 Market power in antitrust cases also can come from 
deception, significantly imperfect or asymmetric information, 
unduly large transaction costs, or from other types of market 
failures that usually are associated with consumer protection 
violations.  
 
 However, instead of traditional end-use consumers being 
harmed, the victims of this deception or imperfect information 
are businesses.  Since this can result in harm to competition 
in entire markets, including higher prices, and these harms 
may not be prevented by competition in the relevant markets, 
they quite properly can give rise to antitrust violations. 
 
 In antitrust cases, when these “consumer protection” 
market failures are present, market power can arise even if no 
firm has a market share large enough for a finding of 
traditional market share based market power.  Although these 
two manifestations of market power have very different 
origins, either type produces the same result.  Either can 
give the firm possessing it the power to raise prices. 
 
 The “consumer protection” type of market power has been a 
small part of the antitrust world for decades.  It certainly 
is used from time to time in mainstream antitrust cases.  The 
purpose of my Testimony will be to urge that it play an even 
larger role in the day-to-day world of antitrust, perhaps 
                     
1  Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of 
Law, and Director, American Antitrust Institute. The author’s 
e-mail address is rlande@ubalt.edu. The author is grateful to 
John Connor, Albert Foer, and Thomas Krattenmaker for 
extremely insightful comments, and to Alice Arcieri and J. 
Andrew Stevens for helpful research assistance. 
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almost as large as the role it plays in consumer protection 
law.   
 
 At the end I will discuss some of the implications that 
could arise for antitrust if we grant this source of market 
power the attention it deserves.  In addition to having an 
effect on our beliefs as to when market power may be present, 
it also could have important effects on such related antitrust 
areas as market definition and entry analysis. 
 
 
I. Market Power Requires A Market Failure. 
 
 A. Market Power From Large Market Shares 
 
 The conventional definition of market power is usually 
expressed as “the power to raise price”.2  Or, colloquially, 
one subject to pure competition takes its prices from the 
interplay of supply and demand, while one with market power 
has some amount of discretion to set its own price.  The key 
distinction for purposes of my Testimony involves the issue of 
from where the discretion arises. 
 
 In the antitrust world, when we say “market power” we 
almost always mean “market share based” market power. And, of 
course, a firm can only have market share based market power 
if it has a market share of at least 40% (or 60% or 90% or 
whatever percentage of a relevant market is believed to be 
enough).  Even if some critical market share is reached, of 
course, the firm has the power to raise prices3 only if entry 
                     
2 See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.8 
(1984). By contrast, monopoly power is usually defined as “the 
power to control prices or exclude competition.”  See United 
States v. E.I duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391  
(1956). This testimony will not attempt to differentiate 
market power from monopoly power. For a fuller and more 
precise definition of these terms in general and relative to 
one another see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & 
Steven C. Salop, Market Power and Monopoly Power In Antitrust 
Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987). 
 
3 Moreover, price issues are not the only considerations. 
Market power also can distort non-price attributes 
anticompetitively even if price is unaffected. See Neil W. 
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using The “Consumer Choice” 
Approach To Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L.J. 175 (2007). 
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is difficult and other conditions are met.4 Even a large 
market share only gives a firm the traditionally-defined power 
to raise prices when a significant market failure is present.5  
If the market is working well even a firm with a 100% market 
share might have no ability to raise prices above the 
competitive level for a significant period.6  
                                                                
 
4 This statement will not discuss product differentiation, and 
whether it can create space between certain products and 
potential substitutes in the eyes of some purchasers. 
 
5 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: 
A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 
Antitrust L.J. 713 (1997). ”A leading scholar of the subject, 
Edwin Mansfield, believes that perfect competition requires 
four conditions: product homogeneity, relatively small buyers 
and sellers, mobile resources, and perfect information. Jack 
Hirshleifer has considered the converse situation and provided 
a list of three possible imperfections that can prevent a 
market from functioning perfectly: imperfect information, time 
lags, and transaction costs. Significant problems in any of 
these areas can cause competition to be suboptimal.” 
 
”Additional market failures are added to some other lists. 
These further potential problems include coerced 
decisionmaking, barriers to the entry of new firms, 
circumstances of natural monopoly, positive or negative 
externalities, and situations involving ‘public goods’, ‘free 
riders’, ‘prisoner's dilemmas’, ‘lemons’, and adverse 
selection. Despite disputes over taxonomy, this basic list of 
factors that can plausibly cause competition to become 
suboptimal is relatively noncontroversial.” 
 
“Far more controversial is the question of just how often 
market failures occur and, therefore, how often remedial 
action under the antitrust or consumer protection statutes 
might be appropriate.” Id. at 724-26.  
 
6 Such markets often are termed “contestable markets”. As the 
American Antitrust Institute noted in its views about 
contestability in its Statement on Concentration: ”There is 
reason to doubt the empirical significance of the strongest 
version of the ‘contestable market’ theory, which holds that 
potential entry can cause even a monopolist benefiting from 
significant economies of scale to price competitively. This 
theory wrongly assumes both that entry requires no significant 
 4
 
 Theoretically, in a perfect, frictionless world, 
businesses could merge to monopoly or meet and fix prices.  
This would result in a technical violation of the antitrust 
laws.  But it could not substantially harm consumer welfare 
because perfect information among businesses and an absence of 
transaction costs would allow some to quickly enter 
monopolized or price-fixed markets and compete away 
supracompetitive margins.  
 
 What makes antitrust injury possible in these 
circumstances is the presence of market failures that are 
external to consumers.  Imperfections in the marketplace, 
involving capital flows, time lags, search costs, faulty 
information, and sunk costs, can enable a monopoly or cartel 
to keep prices elevated for a significant period.7  
 
 
 B. Market Power from “Consumer Protection” 
 Market Failures 
 
 A firm also can obtain the ability to raise prices from 
the types of market failures most often associated with 
consumer protection violations.8  The most common of these 
                                                                
sunk costs (i.e., the entrant’s expenditures on inputs can be 
fully recovered if entry fails) and that the monopolist’s 
price response to entry is delayed.” See 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/296.pdf 
 
7 See Averitt & Lande, supra note 5, at 730-33. 
 
8 The FTC has long described the necessary conditions for 
effective consumer choice in market failure terms when it 
pursues its consumer protection function: 
 
The various components of the statute form an 
integrated whole, allowing the Commission to promote 
the diverse benefits of a free and open economy.  
Thus the ban on unfair competition prevents 
exclusionary or anti-competitive behavior and helps 
preserve a full variety of marketplace options for 
consumers to choose among; the ban on deception 
helps ensure that consumers will not make that 
choice on the basis of misleading information; and 
the ban on unfair practices ensures that the choice 
is not distorted by coercion, the withholding of 
important information, or similar practices.  
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fall within five categories: (1) coercion; (2) undue 
influence; (3) deception; (4) incomplete or asymmetric 
information; or (5) unreliable, uncertain or overly confusing 
information.9
 
 This list of “consumer protection” market failures is 
really not all that different from the types of market 
failures that prevent entry to challenge a monopoly’s 
dominance.  However, consumer protection problems cannot occur 
absent market failures occurring "inside the head" of ultimate 
purchasers.10  Hypothetical purchasers who are perfectly 
informed, rational, and intelligent can never be subject to 
consumer protection abuses.  Ordinary consumers, however, can 
have greater difficulties. 
 
 It is crucial to note, however, that corporate officials 
also can be victimized by deception or imperfect information.  
Sometimes this will only affect that corporation, but 




 C. Can These Constitute Antitrust Violations? 
 
 Can deception and these other market failures give rise 
to antitrust violations, or should we instead term whatever 
harms they cause “consumer protection” problems?  It all 
depends upon whether they distort the offerings of the market 
in question. 
 
 This is because all antitrust violations have in common 
the fact that they all affect or distort the offerings that 
the market provides.  They change the choices that would be 
offered to consumers by the functioning of the free market 
                                                                
Safeguards at all three levels are needed to ensure 
that substantial consumer injury is adequately 
addressed. 
 
Companion Statement on the Commission’s Consumer Unfairness 
Jurisdiction, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,203 at 20,909-3 
(1980).   
 
9 See Averitt & Lande, supra note 5, at 733. 
 
10 Id. at 729-34. 
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competition.11  Consumer protection violations, by contrast, 
detrimentally affect consumers’ ability to choose from among 
the options provided by the market.12  When imperfect 
information, deception or coercion distorts the options 
offered by the market, this quite properly gives rise to an 
antitrust violation. 
 
 It is crucial to note, however, that these consumer 
protection violations, flowing from these “consumer 
protection” market failures, can occur even if the firm 
committing the act in question does not have a monopoly market 
share.  We prosecute a company that commits consumer fraud 
even if its market share is small.  We prosecute fraudulent 
companies even if 80% of the sellers in their market are 
honest.13    
 
 The same thing should be done - and is done - when these  
“consumer protection” market failures give rise to antitrust 
violations.  This happens even if the firms in question do not 
have a traditionally large market share at the time of the 
alleged violation.  To show how this already occurs in 
antitrust, I will briefly discuss three well known single-
firm14 cases; Kodak,15 Rambus,16 and Jefferson Parish.17  Each 
                     
11 Id. at 718-720. 
 
12 Id. at 720-722. 
 
13 It is not controversial to note that consumers can be 
victimized by routine fraud even if 95% of the sellers in a 
market are honest. However, if the market generally is working 
well and if 95% of the companies in it are honest, the 
consumer protection function could be required less often than 
if only 5% of the firms were honest. 
 
14  For a discussion of collusive cases involving similar 
information and search cost issues, see Robert H. Lande & 
Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, 
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wisc. L. Rev. 941, 950-77 (2000). 
 
15 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 
U.S. 451 (1992).   
 
16 Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (2006).  
 
17 Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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involved an alleged antitrust violation by a firm that did 
not, before the violation, have a monopoly market share as 
measured conventionally.  Each relied upon a market failure 
that is more often associated with consumer protection 
violations, such as overly complicated information, a mistake 
or unexpected change in corporate policy, transaction costs, 
third party payments, and/or deception.  Each presented 




II. Kodak  
 
 Kodak is the antitrust case that most prominently stands 
for the proposition that market power can arise from 
information that is imperfect or overly complicated.  Kodak 
also reminds us that just because businesses are involved we 
should not assume they always will possess information perfect 
enough to ensure a competitive outcome, or that a market that 
seems to be competitive, when assessed in terms of traditional 
market shares, inevitably will supply the necessary 
information to the marketplace in a full and timely manner. 
 
 Kodak involved the firm’s requirement that its customers 
purchase the firm’s maintenance services to obtain its spare 
parts.19  What made the Kodak tie-in of special concern was 
                                                                
19 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 
U.S. 451 (1992).  Kodak had changed its photocopier service 
policies around 1985, in an effort to limit the growth of 
independent service organizations.  Customers who had bought 
copiers before the policy change were forced against their 
expectations to pay higher prices as a result of this new tie-
in because they were already locked in to using Kodak 
machines.  For a more detailed discussion of this case see 
Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect 
Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193 (1993). 
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that Kodak was found to have only 20-23% of the market for 
sales of copier machines, and thus would not be considered 
under normal market share standards to hold market power.20  
 
 A key to the Court’s decision was its concern over a 
possible shift in Kodak’s policy that had been unanticipated 
by its customers, and also over consumers’ inability to 
calculate the life-cycle pricing of their copier repairs and 
spare parts.  Defendant’s alleged actions also could be 
characterized as deceptive, or close to it, because it 
violated an understanding that users would be allowed to 
handle maintenance in a certain way over the lifetime of the 
products.21  Due to a lock-in caused by the transaction costs 
of switching to a different copier, they became vulnerable to 
exploitation from Kodak’s tying arrangement. 
 
 Kodak also is significant because it reminded us that it 
was possible for purchasers who were businesses, not 
traditional end-use consumers, to be vulnerable to information 
imperfections and complexities.  Just because businesses are 
involved we should not assume they always will possess 
information perfect enough to ensure a competitive outcome, or 
that a market that seems to be competitive when assessed in 
terms of traditional market shares inevitably will supply the 
necessary information to the marketplace in a full and timely 
manner. 
 
 Kodak also held that switching costs can mean that the 
time to measure market power - the ability of the seller of an 
                     
20 Kodak’s market share was, not surprisingly, in dispute.  The 
Court found, however, that it had 23% of the market for new 
copiers and 20% of the market for new micrographic equipment. 
See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 
612, 616, n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 1993 WL 313162, *1 (N.D.Cal.)(Not reported 
in F. Supp.). 
 
21 This arguable deception by defendant is so important that 
lower courts have found that full disclosure of such terms can 
immunize a firm from Kodak liability. See, e.g., Merck Medco 
Managed Care v. Rite Aid Corp., 1999 WL 691840, *6-*9 (4th 
Cir. 1999); Cant Strip Corp. v. Schuller Int’l, Inc. 1995 WL 
767805, *3-*5 (D.Ariz 1995); Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 980 
F.Supp. 1252, 1254-55 (1997); Alexander v. Phoenix Bond & 
Indem. Co., 149 F.Supp.2d 989, 998-99 (2001). 
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aftermarket product to raise prices - sometimes will be after 
the product is purchased.  In these situations the seller 
might be found to have market power even if it only has a 
modest share of the initial product market. 22  
 
 
III. Rambus and other cases allegedly involving the deception 
of standards setting organizations. 
 
 A firm that has secured, or knows it is about to secure, 
a patent on the intellectual property covered by a standard 
might be able to misrepresent (either expressly or by silence) 
to a standard setting organization that no such patent exists, 
thereby inducing the adoption of a technology that relies on 
the patent and thereby greatly increases its value.  The firm 
might be able to wait until the industry has committed itself 
to the standard and has become locked in; and then assert its 
patent rights.   
 
 The FTC’s case in Rambus involved essentially these 
allegations.23  The FTC held, in effect, that Rambus was guilty 
                     
22 The FTC has brought a number of consumer protection cases 
involving post-hoc contract breaches. Pursuing a tie-in or 
other antitrust matter in these situations may be appropriate 
in cases where consumers have been injured by faulty 
information even if defendants possess no traditionally-
assessed market share-based market power at the time of the 
violation. See Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 347, 
368 (1986) (company breached “lifetime” service contract by 
raising annual renewal fees when it had promised not to do 
so); cf. FTC v. Certified Merchant Services, Civ. Action No. 
4:02cv44, Complaint 28-31 (E.D. Tex.) (unfairness authority 
invoked to keep small businesses from being held subject to 
contracts for credit card processing services on unfavorable 
terms, when the adverse terms had been improperly added to the 
contracts after signature), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/02/cmscmplnt.pdf.  Of course, if 
there is merely a policy change, but no reasonable 
understanding of any promise that the policy would not be 
changed, then there is no violation.  
 
23 Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (2006).  See Press 
Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Finds Rambus Unlawfully 
Obtained Monopoly Power, Aug. 2, 2006, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/rambus.htm. The Commission 
pursued a somewhat similar theory against Unocal. See Union 
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of illegally monopolizing the relevant markets even though the 
company might have had no market power before the deception 
was made - if market power were traditionally defined as 
requiring a huge market share24 of a rigorously defined 
market.25  Moreover, it would have been very difficult to 
determine defendant’s market share at the time of the alleged 
deception because its patents - or perhaps some other firm’s 
patents - could have become crucial, or could have become 
worth very little, depending upon the actions of the standard 
setting organization.   
 
 But even if Rambus’ pre-deception market power was 
uncertain if assessed under a conventional market share based 
approach, the FTC found that it had the power to deceive the 
standard setting organization in a manner that kept the market 
from providing the benefits of competition.  In this way, it 
gave itself post-deception monopoly power.  
 
                                                                
Oil Co., FTC Docket No. 9305. Unocal involved charges that the 
patent-holding firm deceived a unit of the California state 
government as well as other industry participants. Unocal 
eventually agreed to release the relevant patents to the 
public as part of a settlement with the FTC, in the context of 
the firm’s acquisition by Chevron. See Press Release, Federal 
Trade Comm’n, Dual Consent Orders Resolve Competitive Concerns 
About Chevron’s $18 Billion Purchase of Unocal, FTC’s 2003 
Complaint Against Unocal (June 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/chevronunocal.htm. 
 
24 A monopolization violation usually requires that defendant 
possess at least 60% of a rigorously defined market. See 
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble Damages” Really Single 
Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 149-51 (1993), showing that the 
average monopolist between 1890 and 1992 had between a 75% and 
85% market share, with almost none having less than a 60% 
share. By contrast, however, monopsony power, on the buyer 
side, may occur at lower levels of concentration. See Robert 
H. Lande, Beware Buyer Power, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 2004. 
 
25 Some thought that the market power and market share 
requirements of monopolization were unclear in, for example, 
the Dell Computer case See Dell Computer, 121 F.T.C. 616, 632 
(1996) (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, dissenting) (“the majority fails to 
identify the relevant market in which market power assertedly 




IV. Jefferson Parish  
 
 Jefferson Parish v. Hyde26 generalizes the idea that 
market power can flow from “consumer protection” market 
failures because it involved market failures other than 
imperfect or deceptive information.   
 
 Jefferson Parish rejected a finding of market power by a 
firm with a 30% market share,27 holding that this market share 
was insufficient despite the existence of market imperfections 
such as high transaction costs (the travel time of patients) 
and “the prevalence of third party payment for health care 
costs [which] reduces price competition, and a lack of 
adequate information”.28  Even though this case seemed to 
establish a 30% market power “safe harbor” in seller cases, it 
did establish that market failures other than imperfect 
information potentially can be crucial to a Court’s market 
power determination.  
                     
26 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 
27 Id. at 26. 
 
28 Id. at 27. The Court noted: “East Jefferson's market share 
alone was insufficient as a basis to infer market power, and 
buttressed its conclusion by relying on "market imperfections" 
that permit petitioners to charge noncompetitive prices for 
hospital services:  the prevalence of third party payment for 
health care costs reduces price competition, and a lack of 
adequate information renders consumers unable to evaluate the 
quality of the medical care provided by competing hospitals. 
While these factors may generate "market power" in some 
abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of market power 
that justifies condemnation of tying.” (Footnotes omitted.)   
 
Omitted footnote 44 reads: “The Court of Appeals acknowledged 
that absent these market imperfections, there was no basis for 
applying the per se rule against tying. The contract at issue 
here involved only one hospital out of at least twenty in the 
area. Under the analysis applied to a truly competitive 
market, appellant has failed to prove an illegal tying 
arrangement." Id. at 1566.  
 
Omitted footnote 45 reads: “Congress has found these market 




V. Overview of Possible Implications 
 
 Imperfect information and other transaction costs are 
everywhere.  A crucial issue, however, is how significant they 
must be before they can constitute a “market failure” that 
should affect antitrust decisionmaking.29  This requires an 
extremely difficult evaluation - as does the assessment of 
traditional, market share based market power. 
 
 To the extent they exist significantly, however, 
imperfect information and the other “consumer protection” 
market failures can give firms some power unilaterally to 
raise prices above competitive levels.  This is because a firm 
can to some extent be insulated from hard competition from its 
rivals; a firm can to some extent be insulated from entry by 
potential entrants, and these factors also can provide a 
space, cushion, or isolation around consumers similar to that 
created by market share-based market power.30   
  
 In all these situations the firms involved still compete, 
its customers try to get the best deals, and other firms still 
seek to enter.  But the firms compete less effectively, the 
customers search less effectively, and entry becomes less 
likely.  To the extent these tasks are made more difficult by 
“consumer protection” market failures, prices can rise.  The 
isolation or cocoon has the same effects that would arise from 
traditional market share based market power. This cushion - 
whether between firms and consumers, between rivals, or 
between existing firms and potential entrants - can enable the 
beneficiary firm to raise prices.31  This pricing freedom is 
the essence of market power.   
 
                     
29 When is information imperfect enough to affect the choices 
of a large percentage of customers and detrimentally affect 
competition in a market? Since information is almost never 
perfect, this matter of degree can be of the utmost 
importance.   
 
30 For an extended discussion of these issues see Robert H. 
Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing 




 If antitrust were to take these concepts significantly 
more seriously than it does today, this could have profound 
effects on the analysis of market power and related areas. 
 
 1. Market Share requirements for market power could  
 change.  
 
 Kodak had only 20-23% of its relevant market.  In today’s 
 antitrust world, of course, it is almost inconceivable 
 that a firm with double this market share would be found 
 to have traditionally defined market power.  Yet, if the 
 allegations in Kodak were true, competition in the market 
 did not protect consumers adequately, and the harms to 
 consumers were serious.  When the market imperfections 
 discussed in this Testimony are present, ceteris paribus, 
 a lower market share should be required for a finding of 
 market power or monopoly power.  
 
 Another result is that we should be more cautious about 
 establishing substantial market share based safe harbors 
 in the Merger Guidelines or Joint Venture Guidelines, and 




 2. Markets could be defined differently.  
 
 Imperfect information could create more narrowly defined 
 relevant markets because it could effectively prevent 
 customers from turning to certain potential substitutes. 
 Some customers might not know of an option's existence.32  
 If a significant number of potential consumers of plastic 
 conduit, certain types of student loans, or non-
 florescent lightbulbs, were unaware of the existence of a 
 close substitute, perhaps the close substitute should not 
 be considered to be within the same relevant product 
 market.  
   
 Moreover, some customers might not realize that a 
 certain product is a cost effective option, and for other 
 customers the transaction costs of finding another choice 
 - or customers’ beliefs as to the size of these 
                     
32 Of course, sometimes customers who are good shoppers can 
drive out fraudulent sellers and in other ways effectively 
help poor shoppers. 
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 transaction costs - might be so large that the firm in 
 question has some degree of pricing freedom.  
 
 To investigate these questions we should attempt to 
 ascertain the information about the products in question 
 that actually was in the minds of potential customers, 
 rivals, and entrants.  This will tell us whether other 
 products effectively function as substitutes. It 
 introduces consumer behavior and therefore marketing 
 expertise into the antitrust equation.  All this could 
 lead to markets being defined more narrowly and to larger 
 shares being imputed to certain firms within that market. 
 This could have the effect of making it more likely that 
 particular firms will be found to have market power.  
 
 
 3. Entry analysis could be significantly affected.  
 
 Entry that can take place within 2 years is  considered 
 by the Merger Guidelines to be relatively easy and short 
 term.33 However, when we compute this period, we should 
 not always assume that would-be entrants instantly spot 
 the profit opportunity and instantly make the corporate 
 decision to enter. This certainly is not always true.  
 Sometimes it takes a considerable period before a profit 
 opportunity is noticed and a corporation makes and
 decides to implement a decision to enter a market. Yet, 
 these factors are not considered in the Merge 
 Guidelines.34  
 
 Imperfect information similarly can affect firms’ 
 decisions to enter markets in response to a 5-10% 
 price rise, and firms’ perceptions as to the time 
 required to enter markets.  Moreover, the 5-10% test for 
 both entry and market definition would have to be 
 modified because potential entrant and customer reactions 
 to a 5-10% price rise would only “count” if they knew the 
 rise was due to market power. By contrast, perceptions 
 that prices rose due to increased costs or other factors 
                     
33 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 13,104, especially Sections 1, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.  
 
34 Id. at Sections 1 and 3. 
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 would allow firms to increase prices without as much fear 
 of entry or resistance by powerful buyers.  
 
 Suppose potentially competing firms do not realize 
 that prices rose due to an increase in the market power 
 of the firm in question, but instead believed prices 
 increased due to cost increases? If they believed 
 the entire price rise was due to cost increases, they 
 might be very reluctant to enter. In these markets the 
 information imperfections would mean that a price 
 increase of more than 2 years due to increased market 
 power would not cause entry even though the price rise 
 actually was caused by market power.  Thus, the Merger 
 Guidelines “likely” test for entry could be affected, as 
 well as its “timely” test. 
   
 
VI  Conclusions:  The Underutilized Source of Market Power 
 
 No plaintiff has won an antitrust case at the Supreme 
Court in more than a decade. The expansionist portions of some 
of the cases I have cited were discussed in their respective 
opinions mostly just as possibilities, moreover, and they 
largely have been ignored by the lower courts in recent years.  
 
 Nevertheless, consumer protection law's assumptions about 
individuals' capabilities, vulnerabilities, and needs should 
apply to businesses (and officials from standard setting 
organizations, and government officials) as well. Relatively 
new lines of inquiry should be opened in many antitrust cases, 
looking for evidence of information imperfections and other 
“consumer protection” types of market failure.35  These 
                     
35 Predatory pricing may be impossible without imperfect 
information.  See Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An 
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis of Alternative Predation 
Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982).  Zerbe & Cooper demonstrate 
that to the extent we believe in the effects of information 
imperfections, we are more likely to find that predation is 
possible and likely. 
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principles have not been forgotten by the antitrust field, of 
course, as Rambus and related cases demonstrate. But these 
principles should be utilized more often. 
 
 It would be sound public policy to take the potential of 
this form of market power more seriously.  Deception, 
imperfect information and other “consumer protection” 
problems, when they have marketwide effects, and are not 
likely to be prevented by competition in the relevant market, 
should give rise to antitrust violations.   
 
 This is in part because they can cause harms to consumer 
welfare in addition to the higher prices they cause, including 
allocative inefficiency and umbrella effects.  Antitrust 
remedies, including treble damages, are indeed appropriate for 
these situations. The single damages that would be awarded if 
these cases were tried as consumer protection violations, 
fraud, or business torts would provide significantly 
inadequate deterrence.36   
 
     For these reasons, as the agencies contemplate future 
dominant firm cases, they should give more attention to the 
possibility that “consumer protection” market failures might 
create market power even in relatively unconcentrated markets 
and by defendants with relatively modest market shares. 
 
 A more serious consideration of the market failures 
discussed in this Statement also would be consistent with the 
ways we currently approach potential consumer protection 
violations. As noted earlier, in these cases we routinely look 
for market failures due to such factors as deception or 
imperfect information, and we certainly would not decline to 
prosecute a fraudulent seller just because it had a small 
market share or because most of the firms in its market were 
honest.   
 
 I urge the field to apply these insights more often in 
antitrust cases as well. As the agencies contemplate future 
dominant firm cases and any possible consensus Statement over 
                     
36  See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really 
Single Damages? 54 Ohio State L.J. 115 (1993).  This article 
demonstrates that antitrust’s co-called “treble” damages, when 
viewed correctly and in light of optimal deterrence, really 
are only approximately single damages.  A fortiori, damages 
that were only 1/3 as large as antitrust damages would provide 
substantially inadequate deterrence. 
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how to deal with single-firm conduct, they should not exclude 
the possibility that informational issues and other “consumer 
protection” market failures might create market power despite 
relatively low market shares. 
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